It is argued whether phenomena are produced causally or casually, that is, by chance — defined as a set of causes that are unpredictable and independent of each other.

However, while the required unpredictability of the causes of a phenomenon in a so-called casual production may occur with respect to a particular observer and under certain conditions, there is no evidence that it should occur with respect to any observer or under any conditions. Thus the very definition of chance underlies the unjustified assumption of a limit to the knowability of the causes of the phenomenon produced.

Also, although the reciprocal dependence of the causes of a phenomenon on a so-called casual production may not be observed by a particular observer under certain conditions, there is no evidence that it can never be observed by any observer or under any conditions. Thus, again, the very definition of chance underlies this other unjustified assumption, of omniscience on the part of those who affirm it.

In other words, the very idea of casual production requires two unwarranted and, indeed, mutually contradictory assumptions, one of limit to knowability and the other of omniscience — which, eliminated, eliminate the very possibility of chance, as defined above. One can certainly speak of a set of causes not foreseen and whose mutual dependence is not observed by a certain observer and under certain conditions — but the circumstantial cognitive limitations of this observer do not transform a causal production in this chimera called casual production, or perhaps.

“Coincidence”, in turn, is a neutral term, which denotes neither chance nor causality, but simply describes two or more facts (incidences) in some way related to a certain common circumstance. However, the expression “mere coincidence”, by excluding the possibility of mutual dependence between phenomena, is contaminated by the same unjustified assumption, of omniscience by the one who expresses it, who afflicts the notion of chance.

And finally, the notion of synchronicity, proposed by Swiss psychologist C. G. Jung as an alternative to the notions of causality and chance, is confessedly a recognition of the interdependence of objective and subjective events, without explicitly explaining the nature of this interdependence. Et pour cause, since interdependence between phenomena is but another name for causality, which is why the proposed synchronicity does not escape the notion of causality that it seeks to repudiate.